BRK-B Berkshire Hathaway
Fortress earning roughly its cost of equity; 1.74x book still prices a cash redeployment that hasn't happened.
The story
Berkshire remains a fortress conglomerate: a float-funded insurance engine, regulated utilities and BNSF, and a huge equity portfolio, all backed by more than $300B of cash and T-bills and almost no holding-company leverage. Trailing ROE of 10.7% is flattered by mark-to-market equity gains and high T-bill yields. Through-the-cycle operating returns on a $717B book sit around 10%, roughly its cost of equity. Insurance is past peak pricing, so returns now hinge on redeploying the cash pile under new leadership.
Nothing material has changed since 2026-11-12 (price-to-book is still about 1.74x, trailing ROE is 10.7%), so I keep the drivers. A normalized 10% ROE nets out GAAP mark-to-market noise and softening P&C margins; book compounds at about 7% near term from retained earnings and slows to 4.5% terminal, below the 5.1% risk-free rate. A beta of 0.85 and a tiny failure probability reflect conservative leverage and a diversified set of businesses.
Value drivers
| Return on equity (normalized) | 10.0% |
| Book-value growth (Y1) | 7.0% |
| Terminal book growth | 4.5% |
| Beta | 0.85 |
| Failure probability | 0.3% |
| Cost of equity | 8.9% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of excess returns | 63.35B |
| PV of terminal excess | 129.14B |
| Equity value | 907.18B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $427.00 |
Projected excess returns on equity
| Yr | Book equity | ROE | Excess return | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 717.42B | 10.0% | 7.69B | 7.06B |
| 2 | 767.64B | 10.0% | 8.23B | 6.94B |
| 3 | 819.24B | 10.0% | 8.78B | 6.79B |
| 4 | 872.04B | 10.0% | 9.35B | 6.64B |
| 5 | 925.81B | 10.0% | 9.92B | 6.47B |
| 6 | 980.33B | 10.0% | 10.51B | 6.29B |
| 7 | 1.04T | 10.0% | 11.10B | 6.10B |
| 8 | 1.09T | 10.0% | 11.69B | 5.90B |
| 9 | 1.15T | 10.0% | 12.28B | 5.69B |
| 10 | 1.20T | 10.0% | 12.87B | 5.47B |
Key risks
- Cash idles as T-bill yields fall, dragging ROE toward 8-9%
- Softening P&C pricing or a mega-catastrophe compresses underwriting profit
- Post-Buffett capital allocation and a possible loss of the conglomerate premium
Catalysts
- A large accretive acquisition or major buyback program below intrinsic value
- A capital return policy (dividend or systematic buybacks) under new management