FDXF FedEx Freight
A real LTL moat, but at this price you need peak margins; I underwrite only a mid-cycle recovery.
The story
FedEx Freight is the largest US LTL carrier, now standalone after its June 2026 spin-off from FedEx. Its terminal network density and pricing discipline are a real moat, but it is mid-way through a freight recession. Volumes have fallen for four years, and margins dropped from about 22% to about 11% as fixed network costs went uncovered. It is a mature, cyclical franchise, and value depends on how far margins recover through the cycle rather than on structural growth.
I raised y1 growth from 2% to 7% because the 6.84B TTM figure sits well below the 8.79B fiscal-year run-rate, which looks like a post-spin stub or trough, and LTL tonnage tends to mean-revert. I also raised sales-to-capital from 1.17 to 1.5 because the reported ratio is now 1.7 and capex (0.38B) is running below D&A (0.45B), so the network needs less capital to grow. The mid-cycle margin target moves only slightly, from 16.5% to 17.5%, and the time to reach it shortens from 8 to 5 years: that sits below the 19-22% historical peaks and between Saia and ODFL. Even after these changes my value stays well below the price, because the market is paying for a return to peak margins on recovered volumes.
Value drivers
| Revenue growth (Y1) | 7.0% |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% |
| Forecast horizon | 8y |
| Target operating margin | 17.5% |
| Years to target margin | 5 |
| Sales-to-capital | 1.50 |
| Beta | 1.10 |
| Failure probability | 2.0% |
| Cost of capital (WACC) | 9.3% |
| Terminal WACC | 8.9% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of explicit FCFF | 4.17B |
| PV of terminal value | 8.43B |
| Equity value | 8.16B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $54.56 |
Projected free cash flow to the firm
| Yr | Revenue | Growth | Margin | NOPAT | Reinvest | FCFF | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 7.32B | 7.0% | 13.7% | 740.33M | 319.20M | 421.13M | 385.43M |
| 2 | 7.78B | 6.4% | 14.6% | 842.88M | 310.18M | 532.70M | 446.21M |
| 3 | 8.23B | 5.7% | 15.6% | 949.70M | 296.54M | 653.16M | 500.72M |
| 4 | 8.65B | 5.1% | 16.5% | 1.06B | 278.21M | 781.28M | 548.16M |
| 5 | 9.03B | 4.4% | 17.5% | 1.17B | 255.27M | 915.50M | 587.88M |
| 6 | 9.37B | 3.8% | 17.5% | 1.22B | 227.88M | 987.21M | 580.18M |
| 7 | 9.67B | 3.1% | 17.5% | 1.25B | 196.34M | 1.06B | 568.50M |
| 8 | 9.91B | 2.5% | 17.5% | 1.28B | 161.09M | 1.12B | 553.08M |
Key risks
- The freight recession lasts longer and LTL tonnage keeps falling, so margins stay near 11%
- Standalone cost drag after the spin-off (IT, overhead, losing FedEx shared services) caps how far margins can recover
- Pricing pressure from XPO and Saia, which are adding capacity, plus the possible return of Yellow's terminals to competitors, wears down network density economics
Catalysts
- An ISM and industrial production recovery lifts tonnage, with operating leverage on the fixed terminal network
- Standalone cost-reduction and pricing initiatives show up in the first full-year results after the spin-off