FICO Fair Isaac
A score franchise with an intact moat, but regulators now cap its pricing; at about 16x EBIT, it's fairly valued to modestly cheap.
The story
FICO owns the de facto standard US consumer credit score, a toll-road franchise embedded in mortgage, auto and card underwriting, with near-zero capital needs and extraordinary pricing power, plus a smaller, slower-growing decisioning software platform. Over the past few years the scores segment has driven growth mostly through aggressive mortgage price increases, which brought in regulators and politicians: the FHFA has opened the GSEs to VantageScore and the credit bureaus are pushing back on FICO's pricing. FICO is now a mature, highly profitable franchise whose moat is still intact, but whose pricing runway faces real political and competitive limits.
Growth starts at 12%, a bit below the recent 13-16% run because further mortgage price hikes face regulatory pushback, and it fades to 3.5%, below the risk-free rate. I hold margin at 50% rather than the TTM peak of 52% to allow for pricing concessions and competition from VantageScore. Sales-to-capital is set slightly above the reported 1.83, since the business needs almost no capex and its invested capital is distorted by buybacks. The horizon is 8 years, not 12-15: the moat is real, but regulators can limit how long the excess returns last.
Value drivers
| Revenue growth (Y1) | 12.0% |
| Terminal growth | 3.5% |
| Forecast horizon | 8y |
| Target operating margin | 50.0% |
| Years to target margin | 3 |
| Sales-to-capital | 2.00 |
| Beta | 1.10 |
| Failure probability | 2.0% |
| Cost of capital (WACC) | 9.4% |
| Terminal WACC | 9.0% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of explicit FCFF | 7.06B |
| PV of terminal value | 12.35B |
| Equity value | 16.16B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $748.41 |
Projected free cash flow to the firm
| Yr | Revenue | Growth | Margin | NOPAT | Reinvest | FCFF | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2.68B | 12.0% | 51.5% | 1.12B | 143.61M | 978.33M | 894.27M |
| 2 | 2.97B | 10.8% | 50.8% | 1.22B | 144.57M | 1.08B | 902.41M |
| 3 | 3.25B | 9.6% | 50.0% | 1.32B | 142.13M | 1.18B | 900.90M |
| 4 | 3.53B | 8.4% | 50.0% | 1.43B | 135.98M | 1.30B | 904.91M |
| 5 | 3.78B | 7.1% | 50.0% | 1.53B | 125.93M | 1.41B | 898.85M |
| 6 | 4.00B | 5.9% | 50.0% | 1.63B | 111.99M | 1.51B | 882.83M |
| 7 | 4.19B | 4.7% | 50.0% | 1.70B | 94.33M | 1.61B | 857.25M |
| 8 | 4.34B | 3.5% | 50.0% | 1.76B | 73.34M | 1.69B | 822.87M |
Key risks
- FHFA/GSE adoption of VantageScore 4.0 or bi-merge rules erodes FICO's mortgage score volume and pricing
- Political or regulatory caps on score pricing, or bureaus bypassing FICO via direct-licensing disputes
- Debt-funded buybacks have raised leverage (about $2.9B net debt), which amplifies equity risk if growth stalls; a cyclical slowdown in mortgage originations would also hit volumes
Catalysts
- Mortgage refinance recovery as rates fall, driving origination volume and score revenue
- Clarity on the GSE credit score transition, plus faster growth in Platform ARR as decisioning software scales