HD Home Depot (The)
Great franchise, eroding margins; at 339 the market prices a recovery that hasn't arrived yet.
The story
Home Depot is the scale leader in US home improvement, with a moat built on logistics density, supplier leverage and a growing Pro ecosystem, extended by the SRS and GMS acquisitions into specialty distribution. It is a mature franchise working through a housing-turnover trough. Revenue is growing again, helped by acquisitions, but operating margin has slipped every year, from 15.3% to 12.5% TTM, as lower-margin distribution sales and acquisition amortization dilute the core retail business. Higher debt from those deals adds financial risk, though the business is not fragile.
I kept every driver except margin, which I trimmed from 14% to 13.5%. Margin fell another 30bp to 12.5%, and the shift toward distribution sales looks structural, so a full return to the old 14-15% retail margin is no longer the right base case. Growth of 4% fits TTM revenue of 169B (up about 2.7% plus acquisition carry). Sales-to-capital of 2.47 confirms the 2.5 assumption. The share price rose 18% since my last take without any change in the fundamentals, and I am not chasing it.
Value drivers
| Revenue growth (Y1) | 4.0% |
| Terminal growth | 3.0% |
| Forecast horizon | 10y |
| Target operating margin | 13.5% |
| Years to target margin | 5 |
| Sales-to-capital | 2.50 |
| Beta | 1.00 |
| Failure probability | 1.0% |
| Cost of capital (WACC) | 9.0% |
| Terminal WACC | 9.0% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of explicit FCFF | 113.25B |
| PV of terminal value | 142.08B |
| Equity value | 198.93B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $199.40 |
Projected free cash flow to the firm
| Yr | Revenue | Growth | Margin | NOPAT | Reinvest | FCFF | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 175.94B | 4.0% | 12.7% | 17.01B | 2.71B | 14.31B | 13.13B |
| 2 | 182.79B | 3.9% | 12.9% | 17.95B | 2.74B | 15.21B | 12.80B |
| 3 | 189.69B | 3.8% | 13.1% | 18.92B | 2.76B | 16.15B | 12.47B |
| 4 | 196.65B | 3.7% | 13.3% | 19.91B | 2.78B | 17.12B | 12.13B |
| 5 | 203.64B | 3.6% | 13.5% | 20.92B | 2.80B | 18.12B | 11.78B |
| 6 | 210.65B | 3.4% | 13.5% | 21.64B | 2.81B | 18.84B | 11.23B |
| 7 | 217.67B | 3.3% | 13.5% | 22.36B | 2.81B | 19.55B | 10.69B |
| 8 | 224.69B | 3.2% | 13.5% | 23.08B | 2.81B | 20.28B | 10.17B |
| 9 | 231.68B | 3.1% | 13.5% | 23.80B | 2.80B | 21.01B | 9.67B |
| 10 | 238.63B | 3.0% | 13.5% | 24.52B | 2.78B | 21.74B | 9.18B |
Key risks
- Housing turnover stays depressed for longer as mortgage rates remain high, delaying the recovery in big-ticket and Pro spending
- Distribution mix and integration costs keep margins stuck near 12-13% instead of recovering
- Net debt of 54B and its interest cost limit buybacks and amplify a downturn
Catalysts
- Mortgage rates fall and existing home sales recover, lifting comparable sales and operating leverage
- Cost savings from integrating SRS and GMS, plus cross-selling to Pro customers, push margin back toward 14%