MAR Marriott International
Asset-light toll road on global travel; a great business, but the price already assumes steady compounding.
The story
Marriott is the world's largest hotel franchisor and manager: an asset-light fee machine built on 30+ brands and the Bonvoy loyalty network (200M+ members), which owners pay to join and which keeps its unit pipeline growing at mid-single digits. Reported revenue is inflated by cost reimbursements that carry roughly zero margin, so the true economics are a high-margin, low-capital fee stream. It is a mature but still growing franchise: RevPAR growth is slowing toward inflation, net unit growth of about 4-5% and rising credit-card and co-brand fees keep growth above GDP, and high leverage plus buybacks magnify equity returns.
Growth combines net unit growth of about 4.5% with RevPAR growth of about 2% and fades to 3.5%. Margin on gross revenue rises to 19% because high-margin fees outgrow zero-margin reimbursements. I set sales-to-capital at 4.0, well above the trailing 2.16, because new rooms are funded by owners' capital, not Marriott's. The 10-year horizon reflects a durable network and loyalty moat. The baseline $88 understates value because it treats reimbursed revenue as real low-return capital deployment.
Value drivers
| Revenue growth (Y1) | 6.5% |
| Terminal growth | 3.5% |
| Forecast horizon | 10y |
| Target operating margin | 19.0% |
| Years to target margin | 6 |
| Sales-to-capital | 4.00 |
| Beta | 1.05 |
| Failure probability | 1.0% |
| Cost of capital (WACC) | 9.4% |
| Terminal WACC | 9.2% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of explicit FCFF | 28.22B |
| PV of terminal value | 36.25B |
| Equity value | 48.14B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $184.61 |
Projected free cash flow to the firm
| Yr | Revenue | Growth | Margin | NOPAT | Reinvest | FCFF | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 28.65B | 6.5% | 16.6% | 3.64B | 437.19M | 3.20B | 2.93B |
| 2 | 30.42B | 6.2% | 17.1% | 3.98B | 441.73M | 3.53B | 2.95B |
| 3 | 32.19B | 5.8% | 17.5% | 4.33B | 443.62M | 3.88B | 2.97B |
| 4 | 33.96B | 5.5% | 18.0% | 4.69B | 442.67M | 4.25B | 2.97B |
| 5 | 35.72B | 5.2% | 18.5% | 5.07B | 438.71M | 4.63B | 2.95B |
| 6 | 37.45B | 4.8% | 19.0% | 5.45B | 431.61M | 5.02B | 2.93B |
| 7 | 39.13B | 4.5% | 19.0% | 5.70B | 421.27M | 5.28B | 2.81B |
| 8 | 40.76B | 4.2% | 19.0% | 5.94B | 407.62M | 5.53B | 2.69B |
| 9 | 42.32B | 3.8% | 19.0% | 6.16B | 390.63M | 5.77B | 2.57B |
| 10 | 43.81B | 3.5% | 19.0% | 6.38B | 370.34M | 6.01B | 2.45B |
Key risks
- A cyclical RevPAR downturn (travel recession), with incentive management fees falling hardest
- Leverage near 3.5x EBITDA cuts flexibility if fees drop
- OTAs and alternative lodging (Airbnb) pull distribution and pricing power away from brands
Catalysts
- Renegotiated co-brand credit card deals raising high-margin non-RevPAR fees
- Faster net unit growth from conversions and midscale brands in the US and international markets