TKO TKO Group Holdings
Contracted, escalating rights for scarce combat IP; fairly priced to modestly undervalued, governance still caps the multiple.
The story
TKO owns two scarce, global combat-sports franchises, UFC and WWE, plus PBR and a growing live-events and boxing business. Its revenue comes mostly from multi-year, escalating media rights contracts, including the Paramount UFC deal and the Netflix and ESPN WWE deals, along with live events and sponsorship. It is moving from a merger-integration phase into a mature, high-margin, cash-generative stage. Upside now depends on renewing rights at higher prices and adding sponsorship, not on building audiences from scratch, while controlling-holder governance and related-party dealings with Endeavor/Silver Lake limit what outside shareholders get.
I kept every driver from the previous take because the new facts confirm it rather than change it. TTM revenue of 5.54B (about 17% above FY) and a 21.9% margin show the escalating rights deals coming through as expected, and the 30% target is a sustainable level for content-owner economics, not a peak. Before trusting the 411 baseline, check the share count: the 72M input looks wrong, since 36.6B divided by 194 implies roughly 189M shares, and the error would roughly double the per-share value.
Value drivers
| Revenue growth (Y1) | 12.0% |
| Terminal growth | 3.0% |
| Forecast horizon | 10y |
| Target operating margin | 30.0% |
| Years to target margin | 5 |
| Sales-to-capital | 0.80 |
| Beta | 1.05 |
| Failure probability | 2.0% |
| Cost of capital (WACC) | 9.5% |
| Terminal WACC | 9.3% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of explicit FCFF | 8.67B |
| PV of terminal value | 15.70B |
| Equity value | 15.60B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $215.30 |
Projected free cash flow to the firm
| Yr | Revenue | Growth | Margin | NOPAT | Reinvest | FCFF | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 6.21B | 12.0% | 23.5% | 1.28B | 831.32M | 450.61M | 411.59M |
| 2 | 6.89B | 11.0% | 25.1% | 1.52B | 853.48M | 667.62M | 557.01M |
| 3 | 7.58B | 10.0% | 26.8% | 1.78B | 861.24M | 919.96M | 701.08M |
| 4 | 8.26B | 9.0% | 28.4% | 2.06B | 852.63M | 1.21B | 839.89M |
| 5 | 8.92B | 8.0% | 30.0% | 2.35B | 826.10M | 1.52B | 969.60M |
| 6 | 9.55B | 7.0% | 30.0% | 2.52B | 780.67M | 1.73B | 1.01B |
| 7 | 10.12B | 6.0% | 30.0% | 2.67B | 715.98M | 1.95B | 1.03B |
| 8 | 10.63B | 5.0% | 30.0% | 2.80B | 632.45M | 2.17B | 1.05B |
| 9 | 11.05B | 4.0% | 30.0% | 2.91B | 531.26M | 2.38B | 1.05B |
| 10 | 11.38B | 3.0% | 30.0% | 3.00B | 414.38M | 2.58B | 1.04B |
Key risks
- Governance and related-party transfers to Endeavor/Silver Lake take value from minority holders
- Rights renewal or counterparty risk if streaming or linear partners cut sports spending
- Talent, regulatory or antitrust exposure (fighter-pay litigation, the boxing venture, key-person risk around leadership)
Catalysts
- Full-year contribution from the Paramount UFC deal and the Netflix/ESPN WWE contracts lifting margins toward 30%
- Capital returns (buybacks and dividends) plus sponsorship and international live-event growth