VICI Vici Properties
About a 7.3% AFFO yield on inflation-linked casino rents; the market is overpricing tenant risk while growth slows.
The story
VICI owns a triple-net portfolio of casino and experiential real estate (Caesars Palace, MGM Grand, Venetian, regional casinos) on very long leases with CPI-linked escalators, and nearly all of it is booked as sales-type leases, so GAAP D&A is close to zero and net income is a reasonable proxy for FFO. Rent coverage is solid, but Caesars and Penn make up a large share of rent and both carry high leverage. The balance sheet is investment grade (about 5.5x net debt/EBITDA) with mostly fixed-rate debt, so higher rates mainly limit growth through a higher cost of capital for new deals rather than through interest expense.
Nothing material has changed since September, so the drivers stay put. Year-1 growth of 4.5% comes from contractual escalators of about 2-3% plus loan and acquisition activity. Terminal growth of 2.5% is well below the risk-free rate because escalators are capped near inflation. Recurring capex is minimal under triple-net leases (tenants pay it), but I keep a 0.90 AFFO ratio as a cushion for non-cash lease accounting. The model baseline of 52.56 overstates value because it extrapolates the acquisition-driven 15.5% five-year CAGR, which will not repeat at VICI's current size and cost of capital.
Value drivers
| AFFO growth (Y1) | 4.5% |
| Terminal AFFO growth | 2.5% |
| AFFO / FFO ratio | 90.0% |
| Beta | 0.90 |
| Failure probability | 3.0% |
| Cost of equity | 9.0% |
Valuation bridge
| PV of AFFO (explicit) | 16.38B |
| PV of terminal value | 19.86B |
| Equity value | 35.15B |
| ÷ shares → per share | $31.92 |
Projected AFFO
| Yr | FFO | AFFO | Growth | PV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2.46B | 2.21B | 4.5% | 2.03B |
| 2 | 2.56B | 2.30B | 4.3% | 1.94B |
| 3 | 2.66B | 2.40B | 4.1% | 1.85B |
| 4 | 2.77B | 2.49B | 3.8% | 1.76B |
| 5 | 2.87B | 2.58B | 3.6% | 1.68B |
| 6 | 2.96B | 2.67B | 3.4% | 1.59B |
| 7 | 3.06B | 2.75B | 3.2% | 1.51B |
| 8 | 3.15B | 2.83B | 2.9% | 1.42B |
| 9 | 3.23B | 2.91B | 2.7% | 1.34B |
| 10 | 3.31B | 2.98B | 2.5% | 1.26B |
Key risks
- Tenant concentration: Caesars and Penn are highly leveraged, and a rent restructuring would hit AFFO directly
- Cost of capital: if 10-year yields stay near 5%, the spread on new acquisitions shrinks and external growth stalls
- Las Vegas and regional gaming softness could weaken rent coverage and lead to lease renegotiations
Catalysts
- Fed easing compressing net-lease cap rates and reopening accretive deal flow
- New experiential deals or Caesars lease reset economics that prove the long-term rent escalators hold up